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I. Introduction 
The Decree-Law (DL) No. 4/2015 of  7 January approved the new Código 
do Procedimento Administrativo, the Portuguese Code of  Administrative Procedure 
(hereinafter, CPA). It is not our purpose to proceed with an overall assessment of  
the Code in force today,2 but merely to look into a specific solution enshrined within 
the system of  annulment of  administrative acts established therein3 – the solution set 
forth in Article 168 (7) CPA, which establishes a duty of  administrative annulment 
of  final administrative acts contrary to European Union (EU) law.
First, and foremost, the provision under analysis does not stand out for its 
clarity:
“As long as it still can do it, the Administration has the duty to annul an administrative act 
that was declared valid by final judgment handed down by an administrative court based on 
the interpretation of  European Union law, invoking for that purpose a new interpretation of  
that law in a later and final judgment, handed down by an administrative court adjudicating 
at last instance which has enforced a judgment of  a European Union court binding on the 
Portuguese State.”4 
Although tangled, the wording of  Article 168 (7) CPA reveals right away 
that the administrative annulment in question relates to EU law. Contrary to its 
predecessor,5 the new CPA did not disregard the relevance of  EU law, which the 
initial considerations made in the Preamble of  DL No. 4/2015 readily confirm. In 
it, the legislator gives an account of  the need to update the general regime of  the 
administrative procedure in light of  the “new requirements” that have been put to the 
Public Administration and to the exercise of  the administrative function, considering, 
in particular, the “change of  the framework” in which the latter is exercised “by virtue of  
the law and of  European Union law.”6   
In terms of  intentions, the CPA sought to find solutions that are compatible 
with EU law, which is visible in some provisions throughout the Code.7 In this sense, 
the inclusion of  a principle relating to the “sincere cooperation with the European Union” 
in the list of  general principles of  administrative activity is one of  the “significant 
2 For what it is referred to more authorized doctrine – see Carla Amado Gomes, Ana Fernanda 
Neves and Tiago Serrão (eds.), Comentários ao novo Código de Procedimento Administrativo, 2nd edition 
(Lisbon: AAFDL, 2015); and Maria da Glória Garcia et al., Comentários à revisão do Código do 
Procedimento Administrativo (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016). 
3 On the subject, see Licínio Lopes Martins, “A invalidade do acto administrativo no novo Código 
do Procedimento Administrativo: alterações mais relevantes”, and Mário Caldeira, “A figura 
da ‘Anulação Administrativa’ no novo Código do Procedimento Administrativo de 2015”, in 
Comentários ao novo Código de Procedimento Administrativo, 2nd edition, ed. Carla Amado Gomes, Ana 
Fernanda Neves and Tiago Serrão (Lisbon: AAFDL, 2015), 907-922 and 1033-1070, respectively. 
4 Free translation. The original version states as follows: “Desde que ainda o possa fazer, a Administração 
tem o dever de anular o ato administrativo que tenha sido julgado válido por sentença transitada em julgado, proferida 
por um tribunal administrativo com base na interpretação do direito da União Europeia, invocando para o efeito 
nova interpretação desse direito em sentença posterior, transitada em julgado, proferida por um tribunal administrativo 
que, julgando em última instância, tenha dado execução a uma sentença de um tribunal da União Europeia 
vinculativa para o Estado português.” 
5 The Code of  Administrative Procedure approved by the DL No. 442/91, of  15 November, and 
altered by the DL No. 6/96, of  31 January. 
6 See Preamble of  DL No. 4/2015, para. 1 (free translation). 
7 See Articles 19, 143, 146 and 168 (4 and 7) CPA. 
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innovations” introduced by the Code of  2015 and seeks to cover both “the increasing 
participation of  the Portuguese Public Administration in the decision-making process of  the 
European Union and the participation of  European Union institutions and bodies in national 
administrative procedures.”8 So far without any express general provision within the 
Portuguese administrative legal order, the principle, now enshrined in Article 19 
CPA, joins the set of  standard rules of  all Portuguese administrative law,9 although 
this already resulted from EU law and, from the outset – and with greater density –, 
from Article 4 (3) TEU.10 
Indeed, in terms of  normative content, the wording of  Article 19 CPA11 is rather 
poor:12 i) the scope of  the cooperation envisaged is confined to situations provided for 
under EU law; ii) the set of  situations considered (providing information, submitting 
proposals and other forms of  collaboration with the Public Administration of  other 
Member States) is mininal (and does not meet the previously announced standards 
in the Preamble); and iii) the content of  cooperation is limited to meeting deadlines. 
Taking advantage of  a common expression in the European legal lexicon, the 
provision loses its effet util by not including a general and open clause of  cooperation 
applicable in the absence of  a specific rule.13 The provision of  Article 19 CPA is, 
therefore, short of  what results from Article 4 (3) TEU and its densification through 
the CJEU’s14 case-law. 
It is, in fact, settled case-law that, by virtue of  the principle of  sincere cooperation, 
all the authorities of  the Member States, including their administrative bodies, 
must ensure the observance of  EU law within the sphere of  their competences,15 
and the CJEU did not hesitate to base on this principle, some specific obligations 
8 See Preamble of  DL No. 4/2015, para. 5 (free translation). 
9 See Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA e o princípio da boa administração, em 
particular”, in Comentários ao novo Código de Procedimento Administrativo, 2nd edition, ed. Carla Amado 
Gomes, Ana Fernanda Neves and Tiago Serrão (Lisbon: AAFDL, 2015), 169. 
10 For a critical analysis, see Fausto de Quadros, in Comentários à revisão do Código do Procedimento 
Administrativo, ed. Maria da Glória Garcia et al (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 49-50.  
11 Article 19 CPA, regarding the “Principle of  sincere cooperation with the European Union”, provides 
as follows: “1 -  Where European Union law imposes on the Public Administration the obligation to provide 
information, submit proposals or otherwise collaborate with the Public Administration of  other Member States, that 
obligation shall be fulfilled by the deadline set for that purpose. 2 - In the absence of  a specific term, the obligation 
referred to in the preceding paragraph shall be fulfilled in the framework of  the sincere cooperation that must exist 
between the Public Administration and the European Union.” (free translation). The original version states 
as follows: “1 - Sempre que o direito da União Europeia imponha à Administração Pública a obrigação de 
prestar informações, apresentar propostas ou de, por alguma outra forma, colaborar com a Administração Pública de 
outros Estados-membros, essa obrigação deve ser cumprida no prazo para tal estabelecido. 2 - Na ausência de prazo 
específico, a obrigação referida no número anterior é cumprida no quadro da cooperação leal que deve existir entre a 
Administração Pública e a União Europeia”. 
12 Opinion already expressed during the revision that led to the adoption of  the Code of  2015 by 
João Pacheco de Amorim, “Os princípios gerais da atividade administrativa no projeto de revisão do 
Código do Procedimento Administrativo”, Cadernos de Justiça Administrativa 100 (2013): 25. 
13 Miguel Assis Raimundo, “Os princípios no novo CPA…”, 179-180. 
14 As part of  the reform of  the EU’s judicial architecture, the Court of  Justice of  the European 
Union (CJEU) has since September 2016 incorporated two jurisdictions [Article 19 (1) TEU]: 
the Court of  Justice (CJEU) and the General Court (GC) – the text refers to the first of  those 
jurisdictions. 
15 See Judgments of  the Court in Germany v Commission, 12 June 1990, Case C-8/88, EU:C:1990:241, 
recital 13; Kühne, 13 January 2004, Case C-453/00, EU:C:2004:17, recital 20; Kempter, 12 February 
2008, Case C-2/06, EU:C:2008:78, recital 34; Wall, 13 April 2010, Case C-91/08, EU:C:2010:182, 
recital 69; and Byankov, 4 October 2010, Case C-249/11, EU:C:2012:608, recital 64. 
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within the sphere of  administrative authorities of  the Member States.16 Thus, the 
provision of  Article 19 CPA fails to convey the true dimension of  the principle 
of  sincere cooperation as a structuring principle in the necessary intersystematic 
and internormative articulation that governs the exercise of  the EU administrative 
function and the law that governs it. On the way, the notion which underlies the 
principle is lost: the National Administrative Authorities – and, thus, the Portuguese 
Public Administration – are the EU Administrations of  general jurisdiction,17 and to them 
is entrusted, in the first line (Article 291 TFUE),18 the implementation of  EU law as 
a mission that is “essential for the proper functioning of  the Union” and a “matter of  common 
interest” (Article 197 TFUE).19 
This assessment will be the main coordinate that will guide the following 
analysis regarding the solution enshrined in Article 168 (7) CPA. 
16 The case-law established by the CJEU under the principle of  sincere cooperation, with regard 
to primacy of  EU law, direct effect and consistent interpretation, although essentially developed 
with reference to national courts, also concerns the application of  EU law by administrative bodies 
of  the Member States. These principles give rise to specific obligations for national administrative 
authorities, obligations which are particularly relevant in the event of  a contradiction between 
provisions of  national law and of  EU law applicable in a given situation, in which case they ought 
to give preference to the provisions of  EU law, by interpreting the provisions of  national law 
accordingly or, where such interpretation is not possible, refraining from applying provisions of  
national law which conflict with EU law and, where appropriate, apply the provisions of  EU law 
which have direct effect – see, among others, Judgments of  the Court in Fratelli Costanzo, 22 June 
1989, Case 103/88, EU:C:1989:256, recital 31; Ciola, 29 April 1999, Case C-224/97, EU:C:1999:212, 
recital 30; Larsy, 28 June 2001, Case C-118/00, EU:C:2001:368, recitals 51-53; Henkel, 12 
February 2004, Case C-218/01, EU:C:2004:88, recital 60; Impact, 15 April 2008, Case C-268/06, 
EU:C:2008:223, recital 85; Gavieiro, 22 December 2010, Joined Cases C-444/09 and C-456/09, 
EU:C:2010:819, recitals 72 and 73. In legal literature, see John Temple Lang, “The Duties of  
National Authorities Under Community Constitutional Law”, European Law Review 23(2) (1998): 
109-131; and Maartje Verhoeven, The Costanzo Obligation. The Obligation of  National Administrative 
Authorities in the Case of  Incompatibility between National Law and European Law (Intersentia: 2011).  
17 Taking advantage of  the expression used by the (then) Court of  First Instance (CFI) referring, 
however, to the national courts – see Judgment of  the General Court, Tetra Pak, 10 July 1990, 
Case T-51/89, EU:T:1990:41, recital 42. Also qualifying the national public administrations as 
“administrations communes du système européen”, see Mario Chiti, “Les droits administratifs nationaux 
entre harmonisation et pluralisme eurocompatible”, in Traité de droit administratif  européen, 2nd edition, 
dir. Jean-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère (Brussels: Bruylant, 2015), 870. 
18 The wording given to Article 291 TFEU by the Treaty of  Lisbon supports this reading. Under 
this provision, the implementation of  legally binding Union acts falls, on the first line, on Member 
States (para. 1) and only “where uniform conditions” for implementation are needed on the Commission 
(under the control by Member States in accordance with para 3) and “in duly justified specific cases” on 
the Council (para. 2). 
19 A single provision of  a chapter introduced by the Treaty of  Lisbon on administrative cooperation. 
According to Jürgen Schwarze, the amendments introduced by the Treaty of  Lisbon specifically 
concerning the administrative implementation of  EU law, such as the new wording given to Article 
291 TFEU and the introduction of  Article 197 TFEU, demonstrate that Member States are not 
willing to relinquish their administrative autonomy; in relation to the latter provision, the Author 
emphasizes that, despite its symbolic importance, the provision does not create new obligations 
in the sphere of  Member States beyond those already resulting from the principle of  sincere 
cooperation – cfr. Jürgen Schwarze, “European Administrative Law in the Light of  the Treaty 
of  Lisbon”, European Public Law 18(2) (2012), 285-304. On the contrary, Mario Chiti considers 
Article 197 TFEU as the “clé de voûte” of  the whole discipline of  the administrative question under 
the Treaty of  Lisbon, concluding that it has largely wiped out the administrative autonomy of  the 
Member States – Mario Chiti, “Les droits administratifs nationaux entre harmonisation et pluralisme 
eurocompatible”, 874-875.  
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II. The provision of  Article 168 (7) CPA as a rule of  EU 
Administrative Law 
The intersystematic, composite or multilevel nature of  the EU administration is 
widely highlighted,20 as it is a function ensured both by the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of  the Union, and by the administrative authorities of  the Member States 
as co-dependent bodies21 of  the administrative authority of  the Union.22 The legal 
framework governing the exercise of  that function includes not only rules governing 
the organization and the functioning of  the European administration in an organic 
sense (institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of  the Union), but also the general 
principles and rules governing the activity of  the administrative authorities of  the 
Member States as the European administration in a functional sense. Therefore, 
within this “administrative space of  internormativity”23  coexist both sources of  EU 
law and of  national law. 
The normative segment that might be entitled Administrative Law of  the 
European Union24 presupposes a normative pluralism, leading, of  course, to multiple 
methodological difficulties,25 but which must be guided by an idea of  “Euro-compatible 
administrative pluralism”.26 Thus, the expression EU Administrations of  general jurisdiction 
is not merely descriptive of  the leading role of  the administrative authorities of  
the Member States in the implementation of  EU law, but also of  their place in 
the integrated administrative system of  the Union: while continuing to integrate 
their respective national administrative systems, their action as the European 
administration in a functional sense is governed by EU law27 and, in the absence of  
EU law, by national law in compliance with EU law or in accordance with the criteria 
laid down by it.28 
So, in particular, if  the national law which regulates, or in so far as it is used to 
regulate, the activities of  the administrative authorities of  the Member States as EU 
20 See, among others, Maria Luísa Duarte, Direito Administrativo da União Europeia (Coimbra: 
Coimbra Editora, 2008), 28-30; Claudio Franchini, “Les notions d’administration indirecte et de 
coadministration”, in Droit administratif  européen, dir. Jean-Bernard Auby and Jacqueline Dutheil de 
la Rochère (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007), 261; and Mario Chiti, “Forms of  European Administrative 
Action”, Law and Contemporary Problems 68 (2004), 38, respectively. 
21 Jürgen Schwarze, Droit Administratif  Européen, 2nd edition (Brussels: Bruylant, 2009), I-67. 
22 Jacques Ziller, “L’autorité administrative dans l’Union européenne”, in L’autorité de l’Union 
européenne, dir. Loïc Azoulai and Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen (Brussels: Bruylant, 2006), 122. 
23 Maria Luísa Duarte, Direito Administrativo da União Europeia, 100. 
24 See Maria Luísa Duarte, Direito Administrativo da União Europeia, 17-20 and 28-30; and Sophie 
Perez Fernandes, “Administração Pública”, in Direito da União Europeia – Elementos de Direito e Políticas 
da União, ed. Alessandra Silveira, Mariana Canotilho e Pedro Madeira Froufe (Coimbra: Almedina, 
2016), 77-85. 
25 José Joaquim Gomes Canotilho, “Estado de Direito e Internormatividade”, in Direito da União 
Europeia e Transnacionalidade, ed. Alessandra Silveira (Lisbon: Quid Iuris, 2010), 171-185. 
26 Mario Chiti, “Les droits administratifs nationaux …”, 868. 
27 According to the Court’s settled case-law on the principle of  procedural autonomy of  the Member 
States, it is, in the absence of  relevant EU rules, for the national legal systems to regulate the legal 
procedures designed to ensure the implementation of  EU law at national level. On this principle and 
the limits arising from the principles of  effectiveness and equivalence, see in Portuguese legal literature, 
among others, Miguel Prata Roque, Direito Processual Administrativo Europeu: a convergência dinâmica no 
Espaço Europeu de Justiça Administrativa (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2011), 66-88; Fausto de Quadros, 
Direito da União Europeia: Direito Constitucional e Administrativo da União Europeia, 3rd edition (Coimbra: 
Almedina, 2013), 648-652; and ours “Administração Pública”, 106-113.
28 Fausto de Quadros, Direito da União Europeia…, 641 and 643. 
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Administrations of  general jurisdiction, falls within the scope of  EU (Administrative) 
law, then it is possible to qualify Article 168 (7) CPA as a (Portuguese legal) rule of  
Administrative Law of  the European Union, since its purpose is to regulate a specific 
duty of  the Portuguese Public Administration as EU Administration of  general 
jurisdiction. As already mentioned, the provision’s hypothesis refers exclusively to 
EU law. It is based on “a new interpretation of  that law in a later and final judgment, handed 
down by an administrative court adjudicating at last instance which has enforced a judgment of  a 
European Union court binding on the Portuguese State…”, that the Administration is under 
(“As long as it still can do it”…) the duty to annul the administrative act “that was declared 
valid by final judgment handed down by an administrative court based on the interpretation of  
European Union law”.29 
The purpose of  this text is to examine the solution contained in the provision 
in light of  the case-law of  the CJEU that the legislator of  the CPA voluntarily sought 
to codify.30 After all, as EU Administrations of  general jurisdiction, the loyalty of  the 
administrative authorities of  the Member States lies not only in their respective 
national legal systems, but also in certain circumstances as a matter of  priority 
(primacy) in the EU legal order, which they ought to assimilate, as such (that is, in 
accordance with the criteria laid down by EU law), as equally their own.31 The same 
sense of  loyalty manifests itself  in the interpretation of  provisions of  national law 
which govern them when they act within the scope of  EU law.
III. The provision of  Article 168(7) CPA in light of  the case-law 
of  the CJEU
As EU law is part of  the legal framework binding on the administrative 
authorities of  the Member States, it does not leave national administrative laws 
unscathed,32 but alters them, conditions their creation, guides their interpretation 
and adjusts their application. In the Code of  Administrative Procedure currently in 
force in Portugal, the provision that we propose to analyse is of  such paradigmatic 
example. 
The solution enshrined in Article 168(7) CPA seeks to codify the case-law  of  the 
CJEU concerning the delicate problem of  the “review of  national administrative decisions 
that have become final but are contrary to EU law as revealed after their consolidation within the 
legal order”. It is, moreover, almost intuitive to associate it with the Kühne”33 judgment, 
the landmark decision handed down by the CJEU in this matter. Any solution to that 
problem must seek to reconcile requirements of  legal certainty, which point to the 
stability of  the administrative decision, and requirements of  legality under EU law,34 
29 Emphasis added. 
30 In fact, as we shall see below, EU law leaves the “greatest discretion to the national legislature as to whether 
or not prescribe the figure (expressly or implicitly) and to regulate it (for example, the time-limit for the individual 
to request the annulment)”, so that Article 168 (7) CPA cannot be “justified as a result of  an obligation 
under EU law”, Rui Tavares Lanceiro, “O dever de anulação do artigo 168.º, n.º 7, do novo CPA e 
a jurisprudência Kühne & Heitz”, ICJP, 22-23, available at www.icjp.pt (last accessed on 20.6.2017) 
(free translation). 
31 See Herwig C.H. Hofmann, Gerard C. Rowe and Alexander H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy 
of  the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 137. 
32 EU law shapes or “penetrates national administrative laws”, Fausto de Quadros, Direito da União 
Europeia…, 633 (free translation). 
33 Rui Tavares Lanceiro, “O dever de anulação…”, 9. 
34 As the CJEU put the terms of  the equation in Byankov, recital 77. 
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which ought, in principle, to be restored. As already pointed out,35 the problem also 
relates to the relationship between the legal orders of  the Member States and of  the 
Union. It is no coincidence that, in the Kühne judgment and others that followed, 
the question was referred to and answered by the CJEU in light of  the principle of  
sincere cooperation.36 
 The problem identified – and for which Article 168(7) CPA then offers a legal 
solution – has arisen in the case law-law of  the CJEU in three types of  situations. 
1. Situation 1 – the Kühne judgment
In the first situation, the review concerns an administrative decision that became 
final by virtue of  a final judicial decision. That was the case in Kühne. In particular, 
the Netherlands authorities, after carrying out checks on the declarations lodged 
by Kühne & Heitz, reclassified the goods exported by the latter and demanded 
reimbursement of  the amounts granted as export refunds. The court that dismissed 
the appeal lodged by Kühne & Heitz considered, in the light of  the CILFIT case-
law,37 that the interpretation of  the relevant EU rules did not raise doubts, neither 
did Kühne & Heitz request that a question be referred to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. Years later, following a judgment in a case involving other parties38 in which 
the CJEU interpreted the term ‘leg’ in a way that was favourable to it, Kühne & Heitz 
requested from the Netherlands administration, payment of  the refunds which the 
latter had, in its view, wrongly required it to reimburse. Following the rejection of  its 
request, Kühne & Heitz brought an action to the referring court.39 
In its judgment, and again in Kempter,40 the CJEU first addressed the tension 
between legal certainty and legality under EU law, which was underlying the problem 
at hand. By virtue of  the latter, “it is for all the authorities of  the Member States to ensure 
observance of  the rules of  Community law within the sphere of  their competence”, so that 
National Administrative Authorities shall apply the rules of  EU law as interpreted by 
the CJEU “even to legal relationships which arose or were formed before the Court gave its ruling 
on the question on interpretation”.41 In other words, the interpretative ruling given by the 
CJEU is declarative in nature and, therefore, has ex tunc effects.42 Thus, the imperative 
of  legality under EU law points to the restoration of  the legality infringed through 
the elimination of  the measure that was contrary to it. However, the principle of  
legal certainty, which is “one of  a number of  general principles recognised by Community 
law”,43 points to the stability of  administrative decisions as compliance with that 
35 Sophie Perez Fernandes, “O reexame de atos administrativos definitivos contrários ao direito da 
União em matéria de cidadania – os contornos do acórdão Byankov”, Debater a Europa 9 (2013), 81-
82, available at debatereuropa.europe-direct-aveiro.aeva.eu (last accessed 20.6.2017). 
36 See judgment Kühne, recitals 19 and 28; i-21 Germany and Arcor, 19 September 2006, Joined Cases 
C-392/04 and C-422/04, EU:C:2006:586, recital 17; and Byankov, recitals 28 and 64-66. 
37 Judgment of  the Court in CILFIT, 6 October 1982, Case 283/81, EU:C:1982:335, recitals 13-21. 
38 Judgment of  the Court in Voogd, 5 October 1994, Case C-151/93, EU:C:1994:365. 
39 See judgment Kühne, recitals 5-10 and 18. 
40 In which the problem was once again raised in the context of  export refunds – Kempter, recitals 
8-18.  
41 See judgment Kühne, recitals 20-22; and Kempter, recitals 34-36 
42 Without prejudice on the temporal restrictions that the CJEU may, exceptionally and in the 
exercise of  exclusive jurisdiction, place on the interpretation which it lays down – see Judgment of  
the Court in Denkavit italiana, 27 March 1980, Case 61/79, EU:C:1980:100, recitals 16-18. 
43 See judgment Kühne, recital 24; and Kempter, recital 37. 
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principle prevents them from being called into question indefinitely;44 so, “[finality] 
of  an administrative decision, which is acquired upon expiry of  the reasonable time-limits for legal 
remedies or by exhaustion of  those remedies, contributes to such legal certainty”.45 
Seeking a compromise solution,46 the CJEU established the following 
jurisprudence. As a rule, the principle of  legal certainty, as recognised by EU law, 
“does not require that administrative bodies be placed under an obligation, in principle, to reopen 
an administrative decision which has become final”. However, the principle of  sincere 
cooperation imposes on an administrative body, where some circumstances are met, 
“an obligation to review that decision in order to take account of  the interpretation of  the relevant 
provision of  Community law given in the meantime by the Court”.47 Those circumstances/
conditions48 are the following:
1) the administrative body concerned must have, under national law,49 “competence 
to reopen the decision” which has become final; 
2) the decision must have become final “as a result of  a judgment of  a national court 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy”;50 
3) that judgment must have been based “on an interpretation of  Community law 
which, in light of  a subsequent judgment of  the Court, was incorrect and which was adopted without 
a question being referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling”;51 and
4) the individual concerned must have complained to the competent 
administrative body within a reasonable time-limit under national law.52 
44 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recital 51. 
45 See judgment Kühne, recital 24; and Kempter, recital 37. 
46 Maria Luísa Duarte, Direito Administrativo da União Europeia, 111. 
47 See judgment Kühne, recitals 24, 27 and 28; Kempter, recitals 37-38; i-21 Germany and Arcor, recitals 
51-52; and Byankov, recitals 76-77 (emphasis added). 
48 While in Kühne, recital 27, the CJEU refers to “circumstances”, in subsequent case-law it refers to 
them as “conditions” – see Kempter, recital 39; and i-21 Germany and Arcor, recital 52. 
49 In its Opinion in i-21 Germany and Arcor, 16 March 2006, Joined Cases C-392/04 and C-422/04, 
EU:C:2006:181, recital 67, Advocate General D. R. Jarabo Colomer reports “the error in the rule in 
Kühne & Heitz” due to the “reliance on national law, as advocated by the Court of  Justice in such cases”, 
which “raises serious problems, including, in particular, disparities in the protection of  rights derived from the 
Community legal order.” For a general overview of  existing legal systems in the various Member States 
on the subject, see Consequences of  Incompatibility with EC Law for Final Administrative Decisions and Final 
Judgments of  Administrative Courts in the Member States (Warsaw: Association of  the Councils of  State 
and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions, 2008). Criticising the solution, see Dominique Ritleng, 
“Le retrait des actes administratifs contraires au droit communautaire”, in L’état actuel et les perspectives 
du Droit Admnistratif  Européen, dir. Jürgen Schwarze (Brussels: Bruylant, 2010), 266-270; Laurent 
Coutron, “L’irénisme des Cours européennes. Rapport introductive”, in L’obligation de renvoi préjudiciel 
à la Cour de justice. Une obligation sanctionnée?, dir. Laurent Coutron (Brussels: Bruylant, 2014), 40-41. 
50 As will be seen below, the Kühne case-law does not apply where the person concerned has not 
acted judicially in order to challenge the administrative decision which, thus, became final upon 
expiry of  the time-limits for legal remedies available to it. 
51 The judgment in Kempter, recitals 43-44, clarified that the claimant is not required “to have raised, 
in his legal action under domestic law, the point of  Community law that was subsequently the subject of  the Court’s 
preliminary ruling”; in order for that condition to be satisfied, it is sufficient that the point of  EU law 
the interpretation of  which proved to be incorrect in light of  a subsequent judgment of  the CJEU 
was either considered by the national court ruling at last instance or could have been raised by the 
latter of  its own motion. 
52 The CJEU in some way replaces in Kempter, recitals 54-60, the immediacy resulting from the 
judgment in Kühne, recital 28, with the reasonable nature of  the time-limits laid down by national 
law. However, as EU law does not impose a time-limit for the submission of  a request for review 
of  national administrative decisions which have become final, the time-limits set for that purpose by 
national law must comply with both principles of  equivalence and effectiveness. 
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In particular, the second condition makes it possible to limit the scope of  
the Kühne case-law to cases in which, in addition to the consolidated nature of  the 
administrative decision, there is the force of  res judicata of  the final judicial decision 
by virtue of  which the former became final. The Kühne case-law essentially “provides 
a means of  mitigating, [through the principle of  sincere cooperation], the negative effects of  the 
lack of  a reference for a preliminary ruling” (which is embodied in the judicial decision 
by virtue of  which the administrative decision contrary to EU law became final), 
“by offering individuals who have exhausted the remedies available under domestic law a further 
opportunity to assert the rights conferred upon them by Community law.”53 The Kühne case-law 
adds to the framework of  ‘sanctions’ of  EU law for the failure of  national courts 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy to comply with the obligation to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 (3) TFEU.54
It further follows from the Kühne judgment that, where those conditions are met, 
national administrative bodies are under an obligation to review an administrative 
decision contrary to EU law which has become final – only on the basis of  the 
outcome of  that review shall they determine to what extent they are “under an obligation 
to reopen, without adversely affecting the interests of  third parties, the decision in question.”55 
As explained above, EU law does not require National Administrative Authorities 
to be placed under a general obligation to reopen (revoke/annul) an administrative 
decision which has become final (principle of  legal certainty), but only when certain 
conditions are met, are they under an obligation to review that decision in order to 
take account subsequent case-law of  the CJEU in light of  which that decision was 
found to be contrary to EU law (principle of  sincere cooperation). Once the review 
has been carried out in light of  the correct interpretative legal framework and all 
the public and private interests involved have been weighed, it is for the National 
Administrative Authority concerned to determine whether or not to revoke/annul 
the administrative decision – what the requirements of  legality under EU law do not 
tolerate is the inertia of  the administrative authorities of  the Member States in these 
cases. 
2. Situation 2 – the Lucchini judgment
In relation to the Kühne case-law, the Lucchini judgment introduced a sectoral 
exception.56 In fact, in addition to the review of  an administrative decision that has 
become final by virtue of  a final judicial decision, the case also raised a problem of  
competence since the recovery of  State aid declared incompatible with the Internal 
Market was in question. Before the Commission had taken that decision, Lucchini 
had already brought proceedings against the Italian authorities in order to establish 
its right to the payment of  the aid claimed, initiating a judicial saga during which 
the Commission’s decision taken in the meantime was ignored. Moreover, neither 
Lucchini nor the Italian Government brought an action against the Commission’s 
53 Opinion of  Advocate General Yves Bot in Kempter, 24 April 2007, Case C-2/06, EU:C:2007:245, 
recital 82. 
54 Laurent Coutron, “L’irénisme des Cours européennes…”, 39-52. 
55 See judgment Kühne, note 14, para. 27 (emphasis added). 
56 Laurent Coutron, “L’irénisme des Cours européennes…”, 32. To Fausto de Quadros, Direito 
da União Europeia…, 684-687, it follows from the judgments in Kühne and Lucchini differentiated 
schemes for revocation/annulment depending on whether the administrative decision concerns 
matters falling within the exclusive competence of  the Union. 
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decision declaring the State aid incompatible with the Internal Market. As a result, 
the decision granting the aid to Lucchini became final by virtue of  a final judicial 
decision. It was only after exchange of  correspondence with the Commission that 
the Italian authorities revoked that decision and ordered Lucchini to reimburse the 
amounts paid, together with interest. The court that heard the appeal brought by 
Lucchini upheld its claim on the ground that the Public Authorities’ powers to revoke 
their own invalid acts were limited in the case by the finding in a final judgment, that 
there was a right to be granted aid. An appeal was lodged with the Consiglio di Stato, 
which gave rise to the reference for a preliminary ruling at the origin of  the Lucchini 
judgment.57
According to settled case-law, recovery of  State aid declared incompatible with 
the Internal Market is the logical consequence of  the finding that it is unlawful, 
so that the role of  national authorities is limited to ensuring that the execution 
of  the Commission’s decision (they do not enjoy a discretionary power to decide 
differently). If, in the absence of  relevant EU rules, the recovery of  aid must take 
place in accordance with the relevant procedural provisions of  national law, those 
provisions are to be applied in such a way that the recovery required by EU law is 
not rendered practically impossible and taking fully into consideration the interests 
of  the Union.58 In particular, in Alcan, the CJEU had already held as a result, that 
the competent national authority is under the obligation “to revoke a decision granting 
unlawful aid, in accordance with a final decision of  the Commission declaring the aid incompatible 
with the common market and ordering recovery, even if  the authority has allowed the time-limit laid 
down for that purpose under national law in the interest of  legal certainty to elapse” as, once the 
Commission notifies its decision, the recipient of  unlawfully granted aid ceases to be 
in a state of  uncertainty about the possibility of  recovery of  the aid.59 
If  further follows from Lucchini that the obligation to recover the aid remains 
in spite of  a national judicial decision to the contrary and despite the fact that that 
decision has become final. The CJEU held that EU law precludes the application of  
a provision of  national law which seeks to lay down the principle of  res judicata in 
so far as its application prevents the recovery of  State aid which has been found to 
be incompatible with the Internal Market in a decision of  the Commission which 
has become final.60 The ruling in Olimpiclub would clarify that the extent of  this 
erosion of  the principle of  res judicata is limited to the “highly specific situation”, in 
question in Lucchini, concerning the division of  powers between the Member States 
and the Union in the area of  State aid and in which the Commission has, under the 
control of  the judge of  the Union, exclusive competence to assess a national State 
57 See Judgment of  the Court in Lucchini, 18 July 2007, Case C-119/05, EU:C:2007:434, recitals 17-
39; for a chronological reconstruction of  the facts, see Opinion of  the Advocate General L. A. 
Geelhoed in Lucchini, 14 September 2006, Case C-119/05, EU:C:2006:576, para. 13.  
58 See, among others, Judgments of  the Court in Deutsche Milchkontor, 21 September 1983, Joined 
Cases 205 to 215/82, EU:C:1983:233, recitals 30-33; Alcan, 20 March 1997, Case C-24/95, 
EU:C:1997:163, recitals 24, 25 and 34; Commission v Portugal, 27 June 2000, Case C-404/97, 
EU:C:2000:345, recitals 38 and 55; Commission v Slovak Republic, 22 December 2010, Case C-507/08, 
EU:C:2010:802, recitals 42, 43 and 52. That case-law has found an echo in secondary legislation – 
see Article 16 (3) of  Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 of  13 July 2015 laying down detailed rules 
for the application of  Article 108 of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union (OJ L 
248, 24.9.2015, p. 9-29). 
59 See judgment Alcan, recitals 35-38. 
60 See judgment Lucchini, recital 63. 
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aid measure’s compatibility with the Internal Market.61 
Strictly speaking, Lucchini’s claim sought the consolidation of  a national 
judicial decision which, while blatantly ignoring the applicable EU law, recognised its 
right to the payment of  the aid when national courts have no competence to decide 
on the compatibility of  State aid measures with the Internal Market.62 In addition, 
that national judicial decision became final after the Commission’s own decision had 
become final. The CJEU clarified in Commission v Slovak Republic that, on the contrary, 
where the final judicial decision precedes the decision whereby the Commission 
requires the recovery of  the aid, “Lucchini cannot be of  direct relevance”.63 Thus, the 
exceptional and particular character of  the Lucchini jurisprudence is confirmed: as 
was clear from earlier case-law and was subsequently confirmed, “European Union 
law does not in all circumstances require a national court to disapply domestic rules of  procedure 
conferring the force of  res judicata on a judgment, even if  to do so would make it possible to 
remedy an infringement of  European Union law by the judgment in question.”64 EU law did not 
impose such an obligation in the case underlying the judgment in Commission v Slovak 
Republic, but that did not prevent the CJEU from declaring that the Slovak Republic 
had failed to fulfill its obligations by failing to take within the prescribed period, all 
the measures necessary to recover the aid from the beneficiary undertaking.65 
3. Situation 3 – the i-21 Germany and Arcor and Byankov judgments
As mentioned above, the second condition for the application of  the Kühne case-
law is that the administrative decision must have become final “as a result of  a judgment 
of  a national court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy”. That not being the 
case, that is, if  the administrative decision has become final upon expiry of  the time-
limits for legal remedies, the judgment in Khüne “is not directly relevant” – thus clarified 
61 Judgment of  the Court in Olimpiclub, 3 September 2009, Case C-2/08, EU:C:2009:506, recital 25 
(emphasis added). 
62 See judgment Lucchini, recitals 50-52 and 62. The attitude of  Lucchini, which, addressing 
the national courts, sought “the weakest link in the chain of  courts which can be called upon to adjudge 
the lawfulness of  the granting of  State aid” was only considered by Geelhoed in its Opinion but as a 
“subordinate argument” – Opinion in Lucchini, recitals 68, 75 and 83. 
63 See judgment Commission v Slovak Republic, recitals 57-58. 
64 See judgment Commission v Slovak Republic, recital 60. The importance of  the principle of  res 
judicata within the EU legal order was confirmed in, among others, the Judgments of  the Court in 
Köbler, 30 September 2003, Case C-224/01, EU:C:2003:513, recital 38; Kapferer, 16 March 2006, Case 
C-234/04, EU:C:2006:178, recitals 20-21; and Olimpiclub, recitals 20-23. 
65 In the case, the State measure at issue consisted in the writing-off  of  a tax debt of  Frucona 
as part of  an arrangement with creditors approved by the competent court within a recovery 
procedure. In order to execute the Commission’s decision by which the State aid thus granted to 
Frucona was declared incompatible with the internal market, the competent tax office called on 
Frucona to repay the unlawful aid and, since Frucona did not comply with that order, brought a 
debt recovery action before the competent national courts. As its claim was not upheld, the 
tax office requested the filling of  an extraordinary appeal for review of  the judgment on the 
arrangement with creditors, which had acquired the force of  res judicata. Without criticizing 
the judicial procedure followed, the CJEU declared that the Slovak Republic had failed to fulfil 
its obligations as the information provided was not sufficient to conclude “that it took, within the 
prescribed period, all the measures which it could have employed in order to obtain the repayment of  the aid at 
issue”, nor to explain, in particular, “what action was taken in response to the request by the tax office that an 
extraordinary appeal be brought against the contested judgment” – see Commission v Slovak Republic, recitals 
6-14, 53 and 61-65. 
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the judgments in i-21 Germany and Arcor and Byankov.66 Neither those companies nor 
Hristo Byankov had made use of  the available judicial remedies to challenge the 
administrative decisions charging the former fees for individual telecommunications 
licences and prohibiting the latter from leaving the Bulgarian territory. In the first 
case, the two telecommunications undertakings sought the withdrawal of  those 
fee notices on the ground that the Regulation under which they were adopted was 
illegal and unconstitutional. An assessment, in the meantime, was made in court in 
the context of  another procedure in subsequent judicial proceedings, in which the 
undertakings also relied on the national Regulation in question being inconsistent 
with Directive 97/13.67 In turn, Hristo Byankov applied for annulment of  the 
prohibition on leaving the territory, invoking his status as a citizen of  the Union, his 
right to move and reside freely within the Union associated with that status and the 
Directive 2004/38 governing its exercise.68 None of  the claims were successful as the 
conditions for the withdrawal/annulment of  final administrative decisions laid down 
by the domestic laws in question were not met.69  
In both cases, the CJEU considered the National Regulations under which those 
administrative decisions had been adopted contrary to EU law.70 Even though those 
decisions had become final, the question was whether EU law required their review 
and possible revocation/annulment by the competent administrative authorities to 
safeguard the rights which individuals derive from EU law.71 Though the judgment 
in Khüne was not “directly relevant”, the CJEU recalled the principle established therein: 
“finality of  an administrative decision contributes to legal certainty, with the consequence that EU 
law does not require that an administrative body be, in principle, under an obligation to reopen 
an administrative decision which has become final.”72 Thus, in the absence of  relevant EU 
rules, the issue would be to resolve in accordance with the national law of  each 
Member State, provided that both principles of  equivalence and effectiveness were 
respected.73 
In the i-21 Germany and Arcor case, the referring court explained that, according 
to German case-law, administrative bodies have discretion, in principle, to withdraw 
an unlawful administrative decision even if  it has become final. That discretion may, 
however, be extinguished if, to uphold the decision in question, would be “downright 
66 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recitals 53-54; and Byankov, recital 51.
67 Directive 97/13/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  10 April 1997 
on a common framework for general authorizations and individual licences in the field of  
telecommunications services (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997, p. 15-27), repealed by Directive 2002/21/EC of  
the European Parliament and of  the Council of  7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework 
for electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33-50). 
68 Directive 2004/38/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  29 April 2004 on 
the right of  citizens of  the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of  the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/
EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77-123). 
69 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recitals 9-13; and Byankov, recitals 19-27. 
70 The system of  calculation of  the fees for individual licences laid down in the relevant German 
legislation was contrary to Article 11 (1) of  Directive 97/13 and the restriction on the freedom of  
movement resulting from the relevant Bulgarian legislation did not comply with the conditions laid 
down in Article 27 (1) (2) of  Directive 2004/38 – see i-21 Germany and Arcor, recitals 28-42; and 
Byankov, recitals 34-48. 
71 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recital 56; and Byankov, recital 65. 
72 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recital 51; and Byankov, recital 76. 
73 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recital 57; and Byankov, recital 69. 
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intolerable” in respect of  public policy, good faith, fairness, equal treatment, or 
“manifest unlawfulness”. The question was raised as to whether the latter concept was 
applied in accordance with the principle of  equivalence. As the CJEU had clarified 
that the German legislation at issue was “clearly incompatible” with EU law, it called on 
the national authorities to draw all the necessary conclusions from it, since, “pursuant 
to rules of  national law, the authorities are required to withdraw an administrative decision which 
has become final if  that decision is manifestly incompatible with domestic law, that same obligation 
must exist if  the decision is manifestly incompatible with Community law”.74
In the Byankov case, the CJEU’s scrutiny was more detailed. According to the 
information provided by the referring court, Bulgarian law allows for the annulment 
of  final administrative decisions under specified conditions, in particular, where 
there has been a material breach of  one of  the conditions governing its legality. In 
this case, however, that power may only be exercised within a period of  one month 
from the date on which the decision concerned was adopted, in addition to the fact 
that the procedure may not be reopened at the request of  the addressee. As a result, 
Hristo Byankov was unable to obtain a review of  his case, even though the territorial 
prohibition to which he was subject was “clearly contrary to the requirements of  EU law”. 
Considering (i) “the importance which primary law accords to citizenship of  the Union”, (ii) that 
the national legislation at issue perpetuated for an unlimited period a prohibition on 
leaving the territory, thus being the “antithesis of  the freedom conferred by Union citizenship 
to move and reside within the territory of  the Member States”, and (iii) that the obligation to 
review laid down in Article 32 (1) of  Directive 2004/38 was to be a fortiori observed 
in a situation such as that at issue, the CJEU concluded that the Bulgarian legislation 
at issue could not “reasonably be justified by the principle of  legal certainty” and was contrary 
to the principles of  effectiveness and sincere cooperation.75  
IV. In search of  a ‘Euro-compatible’ solution for Article 168 (7) 
CPA
Article 168 (7) CPA is part of  the distinction made by the new CPA between 
the figures of  administrative revocation and administrative annulment and their 
respective schemes.76 As a manifestation of  active administration, revocation determines 
the cessation of  the effects of  a primary administrative act for reasons of  merit, 
convenience, or opportunity, having, as a rule, ex nunc effects, while annulment, 
as a manifestation of  control administration, causes the destruction of  the effects of  
a primary administrative act on the grounds of  its invalidity, having, as a rule, ex 
tunc effects.77/78 With regards to the latter, the difference between administrative 
annulment and judicial annulment was also made evident. Their respective deadlines 
do not necessarily coincide, in addition to being allowed, under certain circumstances 
74 See judgment i-21 Germany and Arcor, recitals 8, 14 and 61-72. 
75 See judgment Byankov, recitals 14-17, 60-62 and 72-82. 
76 For a critical analysis of  this option, and referring to the doctrinal debate scrutinized there, Carla 
Amado Gomes, “A ‘revogação’ do acto administrativo: uma noção pequena”, in Comentários ao novo 
Código de Procedimento Administrativo, 2nd edition, ed. Carla Amado Gomes, Ana Fernanda Neves and 
Tiago Serrão (Lisbon: AAFDL, 2015), 1005-1008; and Marco Caldeira, “A figura da ‘Anulação 
Administrativa’…”, 1036-1041. 
77 See Articles 165 and 171 (1) and (3) CPA. 
78 See Mário Aroso de Almeida, in Maria da Glória Garcia et al., Comentários à revisão do Código do 
Procedimento Administrativo (Coimbra: Almedina, 2016), 337-338. 
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and conditions, the administrative annulment of  administrative acts which can no 
longer be judicially challenged.79 The regime embodied in Article 168 (7) CPA, 
precisely underlies a case of  administrative annulment of  administrative acts that can 
no longer be judicially challenged by virtue of  the fact that the judicial decision that 
declared it valid has become final. 
As stated at the outset, the provision relates exclusively to EU law.80 The basis 
for annulment is the non-conformity of  the primary administrative act with the 
requirements imposed on it by EU law. More for “pedagogical reasons” than from an 
imperative of  EU law, as the case-law of  the CJEU is, in itself, binding on all Member 
States,81 it seems that the intention of  the legislator was to ‘transpose’ the Kühne case-
law. There is, however, no complete coincidence between the conditions set out in 
that judgment and the wording of  Article 168 (7) CPA. Moreover, the terms of  the 
provision do not appear to be entirely compatible with the case-law of  the CJEU to 
which it relates.
The first part of  the provision needs a first precision. According to the wording 
of  Article 168 (7) CPA, the duty to annul provided for therein arises from an 
administrative act that was declared valid by a final judicial decision handed down 
by an administrative court based on the interpretation of  EU law, on the basis of  
a “new interpretation” of  EU law. It is not, however, a case of  supervening invalidity 
as, after the administrative act was adopted, its legal framework of  validity is not 
changed82 – what is revealed is the correct interpretation of  EU law in light of  which 
it should have been adopted. As the CJEU recalled in Kühne, National Administrative 
Authorities shall apply the rules of  EU law as interpreted by the CJEU even to legal 
relationships which arose or were formed before the CJEU gave its interpretative 
ruling.83 To the extent that this judgment has ex tunc effects, the non-conformity 
of  the administrative act with EU law is original, referring to the moment of  its 
adoption, but is revealed by a supervening/subsequent judgment of  the CJEU. 
In addition, the error of  law in the interpretation and application of  EU law 
committed by the administrative body is subsequently repeated in the courts – that is 
also the case underlying the Kühne case-law. Moreover, that case-law seeks to mitigate 
79 See Preamble of  DL No. 4/2015, para. 18. 
80 There is no duty to annul similar to that provided for in Article 168(7) CPA for situations 
that remain exclusively domestic. The existence of  a double standard, whether or not EU law is 
applicable, for the treatment of  the same legal question is not unknown within the Portuguese legal 
order – Article 13 (2) of  the Regime da Responsabilidade Civil Extracontratual do Estado e demais entidades 
públicas (non-contractual civil liability of  the State and other public bodies’ regime) approved by 
the Law No. 67/2007, of  31 December (and altered by the Law No. 31/2008, of  17 July) being 
a paradigmatic example of  this subsequent to recent case-law (see Judgment of  the Tribunal 
Constitucional No. 363/2015, 9 July 2015, Case 185/15, and Judgment of  the Court in Ferreira da 
Silva, 9 September 2015, Case C-160/14, EU:C:2015:565). However, as a potentially harmful result 
in the light of  the principle of  equality, it is likely to fuel the debate about the (un)constitutionality 
of  the provision of  Article 168(7) CPA, not regarding to the solution enshrined therein, but 
in relation to its scope. Questioning the constitutionality of  the provision, see Paulo Otero, 
“Problemas constitucionais do novo Código do Procedimento Administrativo – uma introdução”, 
in Comentários ao novo Código de Procedimento Administrativo, ed. Carla Amado Gomes, Ana Fernanda 
Neves and Tiago Serrão (Lisbon: AAFDL, 2015), 23-26, and Marco Caldeira, “A figura da ‘Anulação 
Administrativa’…”, 1053; rejecting any problem of  constitutionality, see Fausto de Quadros, in 
Maria da Glória Garcia et al., Comentários à revisão do Código do Procedimento Administrativo, 363. 
81 Ibid, 359 (free translation). 
82 Marco Caldeira, “A figura da ‘Anulação Administrativa’…”, 1057. 
83 See Kühne, recitals 20-22; and Kempter, recitals 34-36. 
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the negative effects of  the absence of  a reference for a preliminary ruling by offering 
individuals a further opportunity to assert their rights under EU law. However, and 
contrary to the conditions laid down in the Kühne judgment, Article 168 (7) CPA 
does not require that the judgment that has declared the administrative act valid to be 
rendered by a court adjudicating at last instance, nor does it need to refer to the lack 
of  a reference for a preliminary ruling – it only requires that the judgment becomes 
final. To that extent, the provision is broader than the hypothesis underlying the 
Kühne case-law as it qualifies for annulment an administrative act that has become 
final by virtue of  a final judicial decision, even if  it has not been delivered by a court 
adjudicating at last instance and irrespective of  whether there has been a reference 
for a preliminary ruling (in case it has been withdrawn or the CJEU’s judgment has 
not been duly considered). 
On the other hand, by imposing a duty to annul, the provision makes it unequivocal 
that the first condition set out in Kühne is fulfilled. At the same time, it goes beyond the 
compromise solution resulting from the case-law of  the CJEU previously mentioned. 
It does not follow from that case-law that there is, under EU law, a general obligation 
to revoke/annul an administrative decision which has become final by exhaustion of  
the available legal remedies (or upon expiry of  the reasonable time-limits for those 
remedies),84 but only an obligation to review that decision in order to take account 
of  subsequent case-law of  the CJEU in light of  which that decision was found to be 
contrary to EU law. Only in the field of  State aid does EU law require the revocation/
annulment of  the decision granting the aid declared incompatible with the Internal 
Market and the consequent recovery of  the aid granted, even if  both take place in 
accordance with the relevant procedural provisions of  national law.85 Without being 
obliged to do so by EU law, the CPA chose to impose a duty to annul, which is 
unequivocal from the rigidity of  the expression “has the duty to annul” and reinforced by 
the consideration of  the discretionary power to annul conferred to the Administration 
in the other cases provided for in Article 168 CPA.86 
One may question the legitimacy of  the imposition of  such a duty to annul in 
light of  the increased need for legal certainty underlying cases in which, since the 
administrative act has been subject to judicial review, so to the final administrative 
decision adds the authority of  res judicata. It follows from the Kühne judgment itself  
that the national administrative bodies determine whether to revoke/annul the 
administrative decision, weighting all the public and private interests involved.87 Perhaps 
this is the meaning to be attributed to the initial safeguard clause of  Article 168 (7) CPA 
by which the Administration is under a duty to annul “as long as it still can do it”. This 
segment can therefore be interpreted (in compatible terms with EU law) as excluding 
the duty to annul for reasons of  public interest or for the protection of  the rights and 
legitimate interests of  third parties, or upon the expiry of  the time-limits set in Article 
168 CPA.88 In particular, assuming that the highlighted segment refers to deadlines, this 
should have been made clearer from the wording of  the provision, as, according to the 
case-law of  the CJEU, the application of  a limitation period established by national law 
in a situation governed by EU law must be “sufficiently foreseeable” to respect the principle 
84 See note 48. 
85 See notes 59 and 60. 
86 Marco Caldeira, “A figura da ‘Anulação Administrativa’…”, 1053. 
87 See Kühne, recital 27. 
88 Referring to deadlines, see Rui Tavares Lanceiro, “O dever de anulação…”, 16. 
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of  legal certainty.89
Continuing the analysis of  the first part of  the provision, the question arises as to 
whether the annulment provided for therein is also required when the administrative 
act has not been judicially challenged and thus, has not been declared valid by a final 
judicial decision.90 Such an extensive interpretation would cover situations such as those 
underlying the i-21 Germany and Arcor and Byankov judgments, in addition to allowing an 
interpretation of  Article 168 (7) CPA as an expression of  a general rule by which the 
Administration must, if  not annul, at least review administrative acts that, regardless of  
whether or not they have been judicially challenged, have become final in order to take 
into account the interpretation of  the relevant provision of  EU law subsequently given 
by the CJEU. The combined reading of  those two judgments also reveals the need to 
take account of  the importance of  the material field of  EU law in question in order to 
assess the compatibility with EU law of  the national legal remedies applicable under 
the principle of  procedural autonomy, in addition to emphasize the need to comply 
with the conditions resulting from the principles of  equivalence and effectiveness91 – a 
coordinate particularly relevant with regard to the second part of  the provision under 
analysis. 
Indeed, pursuant to Article 168 (7) CPA, the (subsequent) interpretation of  
EU law on which the annulment is based must be set out “in a later and final judgment, 
handed down by an administrative court adjudicating at last instance which has enforced a judgment 
of  a European Union court binding on the Portuguese State.” This latter segment needs a first 
precision as it must be interpreted as referring to the correct interpretation of  EU law 
resulting from a subsequent judgment of  the CJEU, but not necessarily resulting from 
a judgment given in a case which has the Portuguese State as one of  the ‘parties’, such 
as an action for failure of  the Portuguese State to fulfill obligations or a reference for a 
preliminary ruling on the initiative of  a Portuguese court.92 
In any case, here the provision sets a filter,93 incompatible with EU law, to the 
application of  the case-law of  the CJEU: the Administration is only under the duty to 
annul if  the correct interpretation of  EU law resulting from a subsequent judgment 
of  the CJEU is later enforced (implemented/received) in a judgment handed down 
by a Portuguese administrative court adjudicating at last instance and which has in the 
meantime become final. Two such proceedings are possible – either said judgment 
would be delivered in a case involving the administrative act in question, or in another 
case involving other parties but which would call the same legal framework under 
which it was adopted. The first might be carried out through an extraordinary appeal 
for review,94 but the result of  it ends up rendering the administrative annulment 
provided for in Article 168 (7) CPA useless. In any case, none of  them is compatible 
89 See, among others, Judgments of  the Court in Danske Slagterier, 24 March 2009, Case C-445/06, 
EU:C:2009:178, recitals 30-34, and Cruz & Companhia, 17 September 2014, Case C-341/13, 
EU:C:2014:2230, recitals 57-58. 
90 Raising the question, Marco Caldeira, “A figura da ‘Anulação Administrativa’…”, 1054. 
91 See note 74. 
92 Rui Tavares Lanceiro, “O dever de anulação…”, 17. 
93 Ibid, 18. 
94 On the basis of  Article 696 (f) of  the Code of  Civil Procedure, also applicable to administrative 
procedure pursuant to Article 154 (1) of  the Code of  Procedure in Administrative Courts. For a 
critical analysis of  the provision in the light of  EU law, see Maria José Rangel de Mesquita, O Regime 
da Responsabilidade Civil Extracontratual do Estado e demais Entidades Públicas e o Direito da União Europeia 
(Coimbra: Almedina, 2009), 73-92. 
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with EU law.95 Not only do they make it, in practice, impossible or excessively difficult 
for private parties to exercise the rights which they derive from EU law, but they mainly 
make the binding nature of  the interpretation of  EU law given by the CJEU for the 
Administration dependent on judicial intermediation when, as pointed out in Kühne, 
it is for the administrative authorities of  the Member States to ensure compliance 
with EU law as interpreted, with ex tunc effects, by the CJEU.96 
In other words, the second part of  the provision neglects that the case-law 
of  the CJEU is in itself  part of  the legal framework binding on National Public 
Administrations as EU Administrations of  general jurisdiction. It is, therefore, 
sufficient for the Administration (of  its own motion) or for the individual concerned97 
to invoke, for the purposes of  the annulment provided for in Articule 168(7) CPA, 
the judgment of  the CJEU which, after the judicial decision that declared the 
administrative act valid has become final, clarifies the meaning and scope that shloud 
have been given to the relevant rules of  EU law since their entry into force. 
V. Concluding remarks 
The legislator sought, in Article 168 (7) CPA, to echo the case-law of  the 
CJEU concerning the review of  final national administrative decisions whose 
non-conformity with EU law stems from subsequent jurisprudence of  the CJEU. 
In addition to other problems of  interpretation raised by the rather unfortunate 
wording of  the provision, it is by making the annulment conditional upon judicial 
intermediation which makes it incompatible with EU law. In any case, as EU law 
that is enshrined in national law, the provision of  Article 168 (7) CPA is not only 
an example of  the permeability of  national administrative law to EU law, but also 
enhances the sense of  loyalty that must guide the Portuguese Public Administration 
as an EU Administration of  general jurisdiction. When applying the solution 
enshrined therein, its sense of  loyalty is also, if  not primarily, directed to the EU 
legal order, which ought to be assimilated in accordance with its own criteria. Only 
administrative and judicial practice, however, will make it possible to assess more 
accurately the real impact of  this reception on the general law of  the administrative 
procedure of  such obligations arising from the principle of  sincere cooperation, in 
particular as interpreted in the case-law of  the CJEU.
95 As explains Rui Tavares Lanceiro, “O dever de anulação…”, 18-22.  
96 See Kühne, recitals 20-22. 
97 The individual’s initiative for the review is clear from the Kühne case-law, which, it is recalled, 
offers individuals a further opportunity to assert their rights under EU law in the absence of  a 
reference for a preliminary ruling in the judicial proceedings by virtue of  which the administrative 
decision became final. 
